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INTRODUCTION
In our research (e.g. Hj¢rland, 1992 & 1993; Hj!2lrland & Albrechtsen, 1994, in press), we advocate
a "domain-analytic" approach to Information Science (IS) based on sociology of knowledge and
philosophy of science. This approach presents an alternative to the dominating individualistic
views in IS, such as cognitivism. In this contribution, we shall continue our argument for more
interpretative epistemologies, more emphasis on discourse analysis and a more historical
orientation and draw some implications for classification research.
Besides, this contribution will discuss the difference between scientific and ordinary language and
cognition. Some authors (e.g. Brier, 1992, p. 103 and Christiansen, 1994, p. 37) have interpreted
and criticized "domain analysis" as implying that scientific concepts and scientific cognition
should have a higher status than ordinary concepts and cognition in e.g. classification research. A
typical reaction is the following citation: ~'Common language is the basic referent for all scientific,
logical, mathematical, religious and magical languages. Scientific language is not nearer to the
truth than common language" (Brier, 1992, p.l03).
This reaction is in line with much contemporary epistemology. For instance, the difference found
by Jacob (1994) between scientific classifications and everyday categorization constitutes two
extremes, in that scientific concepts are argued to be formal, whereas everyday concepts be more
flexible. In contrast Sermin & Gergen (1990) advocate that the boundaries between the two
communicative domains are often blurred because the dialogue in science does not constitute a
separate speech community, but draws on the same experiential basis as everyday discourse. Inour
opinion, such reactions make a discussion of this problem mandatory. The latter view by Sermin
& Gergen questions the position of 'scientism', i.e.'that scientific cognition is more true, more
formal and objective than ordinary cognition, whereas Jacob's critique implies the formalism of
scientism versus the flexibility in ordinary communication.
Our main thesis about the critique of "scientism" is, that the dualism between scientific and
ordinary language is questionable. This dualism represents in itself a certain epistemological
position. The critique of "scientism" should be a critique of certain theories and practices of
science, not an attempt to substitute scientific concepts with lay concepts.
THE CONSTRUCTION AND USE OF SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTS, OR:
HOW SCIENTIFIC IS SCIENTIFIC LANGUAGE?
Scientific concepts can, in a formalist view, be regarded as basic devices that control scientific
practice via their formal definitions, or as a language domain which simply distinguishes itself
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from ordinary language and everyday experience. In contrast, recent contributions exposing a more
hermeneutical view of the function of language in scientific communication have found that
scientific concepts can be conceived of as something much more 'fuzzy' and plastic, which cannot
be pinned down by "one-word-to-one-concept" definitions. Under the headline "The Doctrine of
Correct Definition", George Lakoff (1987, p. 172) presents the formalist view of scientific concepts
vs. ordinary concepts:
The metaphysical distinction between essential and contingent properties induces
an epistemological distinction between two kinds of knowledge - definitional
knowledge and encyclopedic knowledge. Definitional knowledge is the knowledge
of the essential properties of words, and encyclopedic knowledge is knowledge of
. the contingent properties of words. On this [objectivist] view, the words of a
language have an objective institutional status. Since words are objectively existing
entities, they have essential and contingent properties. For this reason, objectivists
[rationalists] hold that words have correct definitions - definitions that are
objectively correct as a matter of institutional fact.
This view represents a very formal, nominalistic view of language, which regards words as labels
put on some kind of objective reality, incapable of being subject to different interpretations and
understandings. Further, this above distinction between scientific concepts (based on definitional
knowledge) and ordinary concepts (relying on encyclopedic knowledge) presupposes, as argued by
e.g. the Danish linguist Frans Gregersen (1990 pp. 125-126) for encyclopedic knowledge, that
knowledge is present in meaning production and communication, and "evades historical
development and variation, the two key issues for sociolinguistics" (our translation). We agree with
Gregersen that knowledge and meaning production are interconnected and constantly evolving,
both in "everyday, ordinary communication" as well as in scientific communication. Following
Gregersen, we understand 'meaning production' in a sociolinguistic sense, Le. that 'meaning' is not
a fixed device in lexical, individual memory, but is constructed and negotiated in communication.
In the following we will introduce some recent contributions promoting more hermeneutical views
of the formation of scientific concepts, conceiving them as 'fuzzy' or plastic categories, which
cannot be subject to formalist definitions (Froehlich, 1994;" Van Helvoort, 1993; Hohenester et al,
1988). As a case showing how standardization of scientific concepts can constrain their
development, we introduce a discourse analysis of the psychiatrical classification system ofmental
disorders, DSM-IV (Parkinson McCarthy & Gerring, 1994). The contributions by Froehlich, Van
Helvoort and Hohenstester et al show the difficulty of providing a once-for-all exact definition of
one concept, whereas the latter contribution by Parkinson McCarthy and Gerring (1994) shows
how difficult it can be to prevent this from happening during the process of creating a knowledge
organization scheme.
If the formalist view is right that scientific concepts form a delineated domain of terms with fixed
meanings, then the creation of knowledge organization schemes will imply a transfer model of
mapping them towards an LIS classification framework, such as the structure of a thesaurus. But
if Froehlich and Van Helvoort are right in contending that scientific concepts are 'plastic' and
'fuzzy', then how can LIS impose vocabulary control (I) on indexing terms in, e.g. thesauri? And
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if concepts in a domain-specific classification scheme have already been standardized and hence,
controlled, what is left to the activity of vocabulary control in LIS?
WHY BOTHER WITH DEFINITIONS? RESEARCH CAN PROGRESS WITHOUT
THEM: THE CASES OF VIRUS RESEARCH AND THEORETICAL HIGH ENERGY
PHYSICS
The American psycholinguist George Rey (1983, pp. 255-56) argues that the correct definition of
a concept need not be known by the concept's competent users, and that "correctness" in concept
definition is not equivalent to some kind of essential truth, but is merely provided by the optimal
knowledge of it. This view implies La. that even though a correct definition of a concept may be
available, scientists in a specific knowledge domain need not know or even agree on the definition
of a concept. Similarly, the American philosopher of science, Dudley Shapere (1992) points out
that no aspect of a scientific concept is "essential", unchangeable over time, and that scientists
"often do not fully understand the concepts or theories we are using: we must often explore our
theories in order to discover what they involve" (Shapere, 1992, p. 295).
The review of virus research in the 20th century given by Van Helvoort (1994) is a very relevant
case in this context in that it demonstrates, how the term 'virus' was applied, not primarily to denote
a shared concept, but rather a shared, and evolving domain of research, where the term functioned
as a kind of axis around which different research programmes were created and conducted:
In the first half of the twentieth century the concept of virus was used, on the one
hand, in the form of the concept of 'filterable virus', to demarcate a specific domain
from other etiological agents such as bacteria and protozoa. On the other hand, it
was used in the form of the concept of 'virus disease' to label a specific category of
infectious diseases.
Thus, the term 'virus' was used for a heterogenous group of meanings. In order to
clarify what was meant by the concept 'virus', a new term for the infectious particle
itself was introduced at the end of the 1950's: the virion. (Van Helvoort, 1994,
p.221).
It appears that the 'plasticity' of the virus concept was constructed and deconstructed according to
the evolutions and changes in knowledge in the field of immunology. Further, the concept
functioned as a device for delineating virus researchers from other research communities in the
field. These discoveries by Van Helvoort indicate that virus research was, and maybe still is, an
evolving and not fully grown field of research. In Shapere's words "there is an 'openness' to
scientific concepts, in that any component thereof may be extended in various ways, new
components may be added, and others dropped" (Shapere, 1992, p. 295).
Another relevant case showing the openness or plasticity of scientific concepts is a questionnaire
survey of 35 theoretical high energy physicists in the field of elementary particle physics by
Hohenester et al (1988). Their study investigated the ways these scientists think about
conceptualization of scientific communication and ideas by letting them elaborate on the scientific
concepts 'Theory' and 'Model'. From the outset, the study emphasized that the objective was not to
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Relevance judgements do not conform to the professional, research distinction
between relevance and pertinence. Given that relevance is a natural category, one
acquired in experience, one should attend to its use in a natural language context,
just as end-users might use it. In the history of infopnation science, there is
generated a dubious distinction between x;elevance (public, objective) and
pertinence (private, subjective), a distinction made by academics and researchers
undertaking a spirit of Cartesian modeling and natural science. The professionals
and theoreticians forget that no matter what distinctions they make, users will use
words as they acquire them...If one were forced to pick a word between the two to
describe users' actual use of 'relevance', it would have to be 'pertinence', since as
most of the articles [on relevance and pertinence, reviewed by Froehlich] have
indicated, real-users make judgments based on their needs, not on their stated
queries.
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arrive at formalized definitions, but to understand the methods and practice by which science
proceeds.
The study found that rather than distinguishing between semantic aspects of 'theory' and 'model',
the distinction made by some of the scientists was based on value criteria, Le. a theory was regarded
to be at a higher level than a model ("If I do it, it is a theory, if the other guy does it, it is a model").
The study concludes that the scientific methods are learned from practice, rather than from
textbooks, and that "the knowledge and usage of the scientific method is more intuitive and implicit
in scientists than it is verbalized, articulated, systematically described and then 'applied'''. In
Polanyi's terms, conceptual knowledge in an area of expertise is interwoven with the practice of
the expert and is present in her work as 'tacit' knowledge (Polanyi, 1966). Further, we have earlier
found (Hj~rland and Albrechtsen, 1994) that textbooks, comprising e.g. definitions of domain-
specific concepts and methods for scientific work, which are often applied to elicit domain-specific
knowledge for expert systems in AI, are mostly poor and trivial sources for concept acquisition. In
other words, formalization of scientific concepts in, e.g. textbooks, does not guarantee knowledge
about the meaning of the concepts, because this meaning is constructed during the progress of
scientific work. Hence, a transfer model of mapping formal definitions found in textbooks and
other written 'authoritative' sources is a questionable approach to apply as a single strategy for
concept acquisition in LIS knowledge organization schemes.
DO SCIENTIFIC CONCEPTS EVADE DEFINITIONS?
THE CASE OF THE 'RELEVANCE' CONCEPT IN LIS
From a close look at relevance research in Library and Information Science (LIS), Froehlich (1994,
p. 128) reaches a conclusion which is close to Van Helvoort's conclusion of the plasticity of the
scientific concept 'virus':
'1E
l
'~
j
~
J
,I
:1
z
f
~
t
~iFroehlich finds that the difference in the meanings of 'relevance' and 'pertinence', as perceived by 'j
different researchers and IR-system users, is not to be regarded as a dichotomy, but as perspectivesj
embedded in a much larger category of concepts (a 'graded', or fuzzy category with 'topic' as a core t
concept), which will have different forms of manifestation and be subject to different '~
interpretations, according to the norms or criteria, that are shared by those who work in a particular
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knowledge domain. We agree with Froehlich in his observations of the domain-specificity of
'relevance'. However, while it is true that one cannot stipulate a generic definition of this concept,
we question his proposal of applying the prototype theory (Lakoff, 1987; Rosch, 1978) for LIS
concepts, because this theory of cognitive categorization makes no room for the evolving
construction of meaning in ordinary discourse, let alone the historical developments of knowledge
in research. 'Plasticity' or 'fuzziness' of scientific concepts may indicate a rather immature field,
which can certainly progress and evolve without rigid concept definitions (cf. the'virus'-case).
However, the existence or prevalence of 'plastic' or 'fuzzy' concepts in scientific discourse can also
be due to different, sometimes implicit research paradigms in one discipline, as demonstrated by
Froehlich (1994) for LIS. In our view, it is not impossible to expect that LIS will be able to
construct a more fixed set of well-defined LIS concepts, but that presupposes a view of LIS,
departing from a sociology of science perspective, Le. that concepts are defined according to their
communicative function in the LIS profession and research. In other words, we advocate that rather
than mashing different views of scientific concepts. through the 'blender-approach' of prototype
theory, these different views should be kept as separate ingredients and be explicated in an LIS
knowledge organization scheme.
Re i) The articulated purpose of publishing DSM-IV and its predecessors is to provide a worldwide
classification system which can function as a standard for diagnosing and reporting mental
THE DISCOURSE OF CONCEPT DEFINITION:
THE CASE OF DSM-IV.
The American philosopher of science, Dudley Shapere (1984) claims that "as science proceeds, the
connection between knowledge-claims, domain groupings, and descriptions (and often naming)
tend to become tighter and tighter" (Shapere, 1984, p. 324). His exposition of the development of
scientific concepts and delineation of a knowledge field in tight interconnection with development
of knowledge is very relevant as an explanatory framework for the construction of scientific
concepts: research fields can be more or less mature, and in 'immature' fields, scientific concepts
can sometimes be ill-defined, or 'plastic'.
However, that the progress in knowledge, domain-groupings and construction of scientific
concepts, which is argued by Shapere (1984, p. 324), does not always follow such ideal paths of
development, and that 'plastic' concepts are not totally acceptable when a profession initiates
progress in research, is demonstrated by Parkinson McCarthy and Gerring (1994) in their discourse
analysis of the new version of the psychiatrical cla'ssification scheme for mental disorders,
DSM-IV (Diagnostic and Statistical Manual). They claim that the creators of DSM-IV intend to
force a premature birth of an authoritative category structure, independent of the development of
(different) knowledge claims, and designed, not as a tool for communication between researchers
and practitioners \\;'orking in this kp.owledge domain, but as a competitive parameter, functioning
as a control device for the progress in knowledge in the psychiatrical profession as well as in
competing professions, such as clinical psychology, by attempting to provide these interested
parties with formalized definitions ofwhat mental disorders are. The discourse analysis ofDSM-IV
is conducted via i) a historical exploration of the predecessors of DSM-V; ii) an interpretation of
DSM-IV's task force leaders' published writings about the revision process; and iii) a naturalistic
investigation of the revision work in one of the subcommittees: The Eating Disorder Work Group.
Albrechtsen & Hjl1lrland5Alexandria, VA, October 16, 1994
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Re ii) In their published papers on DSM-IV, the task force leaders of DSM-IV are found to more
or less explicitly to promote a "Progress of Science Narrative", Le. that the revision is following
an 'objective' and 'neutral' course of scientific development, based on empirical investigations of
each disorder in the scheme. According to Parkinson McCarthy & Gerring (1994) this implies that
DSM-IV is ultimately put forward as an agenda for basic research in the field and is placed on top
of three knowledge levels in psychiatry: basic research, applied research, practice.
If this analysis by Parkinson McCarthy and Gerring can be relied upon, then their method of
discourse analysis for the case of DSM-IV is of great importance to LIS for assessing the validity
and quality of knowledge organization schemes created by specific professions. The discourse
analysis of DSM-IV shows how standardization, and hence, fonnalization of scientific concepts,
can be applied to transfonn a practice domain into a theoretical domain, which is delineated from,
and even supervenes competing professions. In standardization, 'fuzzy' or 'plastic' concepts cannot
be accepted. Their definitions shall be unambiguous, and there is no room for dissent. In this case,
6Albrechtsen & HjliSrland
Re iii): The naturalistic investigation identified some conflicting views of how concept acquisition
should be done for DSM-IV: One member of the subcommittee on Eating Disorders tried to
promote a new category: Binge Eating Disorder ('Overeating') for DSM-IV, identified in his
clinical practice. The task force leader for DSM-IV challenged him to provide empirical evidence
for this new disorder, and in so doing, he actually implied the possibility that DSM-IV can precede
research. In contrast, another member of the committee would rather have DSM-IV follow
research and "wants to establish psychiatry as a mature scientific field beyond such controversy,
beyond the place where pressure from lay groups can influence what counts as a mental disorder"
(p. 176). As a compromise between the empirici~t approach to category identification and an expert
consensus model for acknowledging the new concept, the proposer was asked to conduct empirical
research in Binge Eating and publish the results in acknowledged medical journals. The members
of the subcommittee were offered a position as authorities for assessing the new category.
Eventually, the proposer succeeded in getting funding for his research, published his work together
with experts in the field of eating disorders (one of them on the subcommittee), and the new
concept was entered as a candidate category for DSM-IV.
disorders. However, its immediate predecessors, DSM-III and DSM-IIIR, are found to represent a
shift in psychiatry towards 'the biomedical model' of mental disorders, where these are seen as
discrete phenomena, caused by biological factors in individuals. Parkinson McCarthy and Gerring
(1994) trace this shift back to the Gennan psychiatrist Emil Kraepelin who presented a textbook,
intended as a cognitive authority for students and practitioners in psychiatry, comprising a
classification system of 48 disorders with fonnal definitions of each. UntH the advent of DSM-III
in 1980, such approaches were unsuccessful, however, in having any impact in the United States.
But immediately after DSM-Ill's publication, a hot debate between researchers and practitioners in
psychiatry and clinical psychology evolved, and in 1992, the creation ofDSM-IV began. Parkinson
McCarthy & Gening (1994) claim that this revision activity was not an incidental event, and "we
believe the revision is best understood as working to control the shape of the intertextual web of
the mental health field and thus influencing the agenda for research as well as relationships among
contending constituencies" (Parkinson McCarthy & Getting, 1994, p. 163). By 'intertextual web'
is meant the communication between the competing authors ofresearch papers on how to conceive
mental disorders, as found in their citation patterns.
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consensus cannot be arrived at by adhering to right of the better argument, forwarded by the
German sociologist and language philosopher Jiirgen Habermas (1971), because every concept
should be subject to empirical evidence. LIS should hence be careful about taking over existing
professional/scientific classifications without critical investigations of the history of their social
construction, and: "The criticism of a scientific categorization normally implies a critique of the
science, which has developed that categorization." (Hj!2lrland, 1994, p. 96).
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS MADE EASY:
THE CASE OF AUTOMATED TEXT ANALYSIS FOR IMMUNOLOGY RESEARCH
Parkinson McCarthy and Gerring's analysis of the discourse in the creation ofDSM~IV represents
an interpretative approach to identifying conflicts in the construction and use ofscientific concepts.
Discourse analysis can, however, also be understood in a formalist sense, namely as an automatic
text analysis of text corpora compiled from one domain. Zelig Harris (formalist language school)
proposes a metalanguage for formalizing what he calls "science sublanguages" (Harris, 1988, pp.
33-56). He presents a project on 'discourse analysis' of the literature of immunology (c1935-1966),
where the method used for eliciting the relevant "science sublanguage" was to compile a text
corpus with linguistic data from the articles, analyze word co-occurrences and identify synonyms,
resulting in a classificatory structure, equivalent to domain-specific facets: AGENTS and
OBJECTS: antigen(G), antibody (A), inject (1), tissue (T), cell (C), and ACTIONS and
PROCESSES between specific agents and objects, such as: appear in, produced by, secreted by,
between A and C. (Harris, pp. 41-48). The purpose of creating this structure was to obtain an
overall framework for assessing the field of immunology, e.g. locate differences in experimental
designs and disagreements about e.g. whether lymphocytes produce antibodies or not. Harris's
data-driven approach, though very interesting seen from a domain-analytic perspective, explicitly
ignores what is termed as 'metascience material': "Metascience material, giving the scientist's
relation to the information of the science, can be separated off" (Harris, 1988, p. 45). This reveals
a mechanistic conception of scientific communication, in that it did not consider the societal
conditions and constraints under which the immunology research was conducted, nor did it
consider any possible evolution, change or plasticity of the terms in the field, as demonstrated by
Van Helvoort for the term 'virus', a term belonging to a related research domain.
Harris's work is, however, very relevant in the context of classification practice, in particular for
concept acquisition in LIS thesauri, which is often conducted using similar techniques, usually
termed as "bottom-up thesaurus construction" (cf. e.g. Lancaster, 1977); such techniques have
paved the way for semi~automatic thesaurus construction methods, where terminology compilation
and facet analysis follow similar principles. In this context it should be mentioned that Harris's
work (e.g. Harris, 1968 and 1988) is viewed (forinstance by Jakobson, 1973) as classic in the field
of mathematical linguistics, where set theory, Boolean algebra, statistic calculus of probability and
information theory from mathematics have been applied to study the structure of language. It is
thought-provoking to consider how applications of mathematical theories in linguistics have been
transferred to LIS practice without discussions of their origin in mathematics, nor their possible
shortcomings for language processing, let alone discussions of their applicability for LIS
requirements.
Alexandria, VA, October 16, 1994 7 Albrechtsen & Hjl!lrland
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In his article "How Ordinary is Ordinary Language?" (1973), Stanley E. Fish questions the method
of text analysis, based on linguistics, prevailing in the 1970's in literature studies, where some
literature critics propose a distinction between literary and ordinary language, in attempts at setting
DISCUSSION
It appears from the above discussions in cognitive psychology and linguistics, sociolinguistics and
philosophy of science of scientific concept formation that scientific concepts and terms play
different roles depending on the societal and developmental conditions in a particular field. What
lessons can be learned from this?
8Albrechtsen & Hj~r1and
i) A field may be immature, as is perhaps the case for the virus concept, resulting in 'plastic'
concepts, because even though a field sets out to study a particular phenomenon, it only knows
something, not all about this phenomenon - that is the very aim of the research - but the field
has to give its 'child' a name, and hence this 'name', or rather term will have different meanings over
time. ii) A field may be mature, perhaps, as in the case of high energy physics, but engaging in
concept definitions is secondary to using the concepts as tools in scientific activity and
communication, because the field progresses so fast that any definition will lag behind; iii)
'Fuzziness' in scientific concepts can also be due to competing, sometimes implicit, research
paradigms in one field, such as LIS, where extremities include rationalistic definition endeavours/
empiricist data compilation versus studies of individual users' cognitive categorizations. In this
case, one concept will have different meanings; iv) Classification schemes, such as DSM-III and
DSM-IV, can be promoted as an authoritative source of how a field is organized, but may disregard
other worldviews of the same domain; hence, one concept may be presented as having a fixed,
standard meaning, but may in fact have different meanings, which should be found elsewhere; v)
From the formalistic study by Harris in immunology we find that even though terms and structures
may be acquired automatically, the scientific concepts lose their metascientific contextualizations,
providing the very framework for interpreting the data.
It is hence not an easy task to stipulate a ready~to-hand technique of identifying and analyzing
scientific concepts for concept acquisition in LIS knowledge organization schemes. For each
domain investigated, the methods for doing this will vary. But from the cases presented above we
find that interpretative approaches, based on critical assessments ofexisting classification schemes
and discussions of concepts in review literature, are very good sources for gaining knowledge
about concepts, worldviews and the progress of knowledge in a domain. Scientific concepts may
perhaps to some extent be identified automatically, but the context of the compiled data may be
lost. What ill/l and should be investigated is the communiCative function, the variety and history of
scientific concepts. '
WHEN AND WHY DID ORDINARY LANGUAGE BECOME EXTRAORDINARY?
The reasons for variations in the meanings of scientific concepts cannot, however, solely be
explained by introducing a philosophy or sociology of science perspective, as we have implied
above. A deeper understanding of the problems at stake entails a discussion of different
conceptions of language, i.e. formalist versus more hermeneutical conceptions of language and
their implications for whether to distrust the scientific organization of knowledge as artificial in
favour of promoting more informal, or "natural" approaches to the organization of knowledge.
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up boundaries between the profession of literary critics (whose object is literary language) and
linguists (whose object is ordinary language). One critic even concludes that "The fact of the matter
is that criticism.. .is an autonomous activity". In Fish's view, this attempt at establishing literary
critics as an autonomous institution i) disregards the interplay between linguistics and literature ii)
accepts "the positivist assumption that ordinary language is available to a purely formalist
description", hence excluding the subjective aspects of literature, e.g. values and intentions iii)
creates a deviation theory for both, which "trivializes the norm and therefore trivializes everything
else" (Fish, 1973, p. 44).
In agreement with Fish (1973), Henriksen (1990) and Semin & Gergen (1992), we find that there
isa dialectical interplay between everyday discourse and scientific discourse, in that in each
domain, language is used for a specific purpose. The interweb between the two discourses is
elegantly explained by the Norwegian linguist Ragnar Rommetveit (1992), who advocates a
"dialogical perspective":
A number of studies of academic theory versus commonplace understanding in various knowledge
domains address the relationship of understanding the lay level with that of the scientist, where
some authors taking a social constructionist perspective of language argue that scientists often
draw on roughly the same domain of everyday understandings as other members of the culture,
thereby eradicating the traditional boundaries that have kept the two distinct (Semin and Gergen,
1992). The dualism between ordinary language and scientific language is hence an artificial
distinction, imposed by a formalist view of language as an object related to different and segregated
"speech communities".
Fish concludes that "There is no such thing as ordinary language, at least not in the naive sense
often intended by that the term: an abstract formal system, which, in John Searle's words, is only
used incidentally for purposes of human communication" (Fish, 1973, p.49). Fish's point that
'ordinary language' has been deliberately segregated from professional discourse as an object for
formal language analysis, a segregation which is rooted in a positivist, formalist conception of
language, indicates that the dualism between the two language domains is questionable, because it
has been imposed rather than discovered. In her critique of contemporary terminology work in
Denmark, distinguishing between Languages for Special Purposes (LSP) and Languages for
General Purposes (GLP), the Danish linguist Carol Henriksen thus concludes that "Every time you
use language, it is for a special purpose." (Henriksen, 1990, p. 28).
Albrechtsen & Hj~rland9Alexandria, VA, October 16, 1994
Contextbound understanding of our "Lebenswelt" from within as mediated by
ordinary language is transcended by fixation ofperspective within separate domains
ofpractical-technological, professional and scientific expertise and by exploitation
of technology that extends and transcends our human sensory-motor equipment.
Fixation of perspective is thus essential in the ramification of fragments ofordinary
language into highly specialized technological, professional and scientific
terminologies, i.e. in the historical development of monological discourse within
different enclaves ofexpert knowledge out of initially holistic, perspective-relative,
and socially negotiable human cognition. Over time, such terminologies are to some
extent assimilated into the everyday language of enlightened lay people and
reflected in a novel, collectively endorsed standards of correctness for use and
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novel, shared realities. Ordinary language as recursively affected by its
transcendence under conditions of historical change thus entails significant
transformations of our understanding of the world and ourselves." (Rommetveit,
1992, pp. 23-24).
CATEGORIZATION IN EVERYDAY DISCOURSE VERSUS SCIENTIFIC
CLASSIFICATIONS.
In a recent contribution to a discussion of classification as a communicative constraint, Jacob
(1994) has argued, that scientific classification is too restrictive, too constrained because of the
special perspectives in the sciences, and that less domain-specific, less rigid categorizations are
needed. Jacob's view of the restrictiveness of scientific classifications may imply a criticism of
tendencies in these sciences:
10Albrechtsen & Hjf/lrland
The need to ensure that disciplinary knowledge is consistent across individuals
favor of the stability ofreference provided by well-defined, discipline-based classes
and forces the surrender of that very flexibility and plasticity that characterizes
cognitive categories. As a result, experientially-based categories lose their inherent
ability to accommodate new or individualized experiences and are transformed into
rigidly bounded and concretized domain-specific classes through a process of
formal analytic definition." (Jacob, 1994, p. 102).
We have earlier argued that scientific concepts are not always formalized or fixed, and that they can
be applied as flexible tools to facilitate communication and hence the progress in science. At the
same time, such plasticity in scientific concepts poses a challenge to vocabulary control in LIS: in
Jacob's terms, a traditional LIS classification scheme is artificial in that "it is a tool or artifact
created to express purpose of establishing order". This is put in opposition to the process of
communication between individuals: "This process of becoming demands that the meaning of the
word is not concretized but remains flexible, plastic, and responsive, capable of incorporating, or
being incorporated within, the as yet unspoken response." We agree that LIS classification schemes
are often rigid in their structures and concepts definitions, but these schemes have not been built as
stand-alone artifacts, but as tools for retrieval. However, we find that the problem facing LIS may
be its tendency to acquire scientific concepts, that have been formally defined, hence implicitly
overtaking a scientistic worldview. In addition, one may also question the rigidity of the hierarchies
or network structures of delineated concepts which characterizes the traditional approaches to
classification and thesaurus construction. In short, the structuralist paradigm imposed on LIS,
founded on a Saussurean view of language as a sign system and transferred (implicitly) to, in
particular thesauri: "A linguistic sign, [Saussure] suggested, may therefore adequately be defined
only in terms of the relations which it contracts with other signs: linguistic units possess a purely
relational identity" (Sinha, 1988, p. 19). In other words, we propose that LIS should pay more
attention to the middle level between traditional classification schemes and the communication
between individuals: the dynamic construction of scientific concepts and the challenges that this
poses for defining more flexible structures and concept definitions in LIS representations of
knowledge. This imposes a requirement for LIS to question its all-embracing practice of structural
analysis, in casu facet analysis ofconcepts, and pay more attention than hitherto to concept analysis
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using an interpretative approach of identifying worldviews, concept development and linguistic
variations.
LANGUAGE, CATEGORIZATION AND CLASSIFICATION
The famous American linguist Leonard Bloomfield wrote in his main work "Language" from 1933,
that the correct meaning ofa word is the scientific analysis of that word. He used the example "salt"
and argued, that the chemical analysis of salt as "NaCI" determined the exact meaning ofthis word.
Bloomfield represented a view of language of an extreme behavioristic, positivistic and
nominalistic nature. Nominalism is the view, that concepts are only labels put on individual
perceptions of units of knowledge. Nominalism makes no room for an active role for language in
the perception ofreality. This view is now widely regarded as obsolete. Today, influences from e.g.
hermeneutics have shown, that language does play an active role in cognition. Among the
arguments raised against Bloomfield's nominalism, is the following by the Danish linguist Lars
Henriksen (1994): If Bloomfield was right, then it would be impossible to speak about tulips
without asking a botanist, or to say that it is raining without being a meteorologist. A scientific
explanation is not the same as the meaning of words, for the simple reason, that words do not
indicate reality - but the experienced reality. The words express our experience and understanding
of reality, not its objective and true nature. In the latter case, words like "mermaid" and "unicorn"
would be meaningless, because their referents are not existing, concrete phenomena.
The rejection of nominalistic positions such as Bloomfield's has promoted more subjective and
relativistic theories, including theories from hermeneutical traditions, focussing on the
communicative function oflanguage (e.g. Halliday, 1977, Jakobson, 1973), the culture-specific
aspects of language of language structure and use (e.g. Berlin & Kay, 1969, Whorl, 1965) and the
experiential aspects of everyday categorization (Lakoff, 1987). Where nominalism made no place
for language in the perception of reality, some of the alternative theories have even defined
language something all-embracing or comprehensive, e.g.: "Nothing exists except through
language", Winograd & Flores argue (1987, e.g. p.73).
We have argued that there is a relationship as well as a distinction between ordinary and scientific
language: in both domains, meaning is constructed and constantly evolving in oral and written
communication. However, ordinary and scientific discourse are constrained by very different
goals. The aim ofresearch is to make progress in general knowledge where the goals and intentions
ofordinary discourse are specific to the concrete activity in which its participants are involved. The
creation and meaning of concepts in everyday discourse is hence of a situation-specific kind,
whereas the formation and organization of scientific knowledge is of a general kind. In indicating
that scientific principles are the most general kind of knowledge organization, have we then
returned to the behaviorism of Bloomfield? No, we have not. But we have also tried to avoid the
relativity and subjectivity of other views, including many hermeneutic approaches. Theories about
mind and language based on socio-cognitive and domain-specific principles have an increasing
influence now in the 1990's after the domination ofvery rationalistic, AI-like theories in the 1980's.
The Norwegian psycholinguist Ragnar Rommetveit is one important researcher, who is following
socio-cognitive and dialogical principles. In his view, the important difference between ordinary
and scientific language is thus the fixedness of perspective in scientific language, and the more
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flexible, unbound meanings in ordinary language. Both kinds of languages are effective in their
respective domains (Rommetveit, 1992).
12
IMPLICATIONS FOR CLASSIFICATION RESEARCH OR:
HOW CONTROLLED ARE CONTROLLED VOCABULARIES?
The main thesis of this contribution was that the duality between scientific and ordinary language
is questionable, and we found that this duality was rooted in a certain epistemological position,
namely a formalist view of language, which disregards the interplay between scientific and
ordinary cognition, and promotes a very rigoristic (linguistic) division of labor. We have presented
the communicative aspects of scientific concept formation and found that in order to acquire such
concepts for LIS classification schemes, the formalist approaches are inadequate, and should be
replaced by more interpretative approaches. We have tried to clarify how scientific knowledge is
of a general kind, created in the activity of research, and that there is a great variety in the meaning
and use of the concepts, which is not to be found via automatic concept acquisition.
Albrechtsen & Hj~r1and
Traditionally, the activities of constructing LIS knowledge organization schemes follow a model
of concept identification, concept analysis (and facet analysis), terminological control and
semantic control, often resulting in a kind of 'crucifixion' approach, which constrains further
developments in knowledge about alternative worldviews or structures in the activity of the
thesaurus designer. Concept identification and concept analysis are fundamental to building a
thesaurus, which is not "just another semiotics system" (in the terminology of Frohmann, 1994),
and we shall conclude by shedding light on these activities and provide our recommendations for
concept acquisition and analysis in thesauri, following an interpretative approach rather than a
formalist approach.
Concept identification for LIS thesauri is usually recommended to follow a topdown approach, a
bottom-up approach, or a combination of both (Lancaster, 1977). Concept identification using a
topdown approach investigates existing classification schemes, thesauri and authoritative
dictionaries and textbooks of the covered knowledge domain. This presupposes an expert
consensus model as a point of departure. However, concepts in existing classification schemes, as
demonstrated by Parkinson McCarthy and Gerring (1994) for DSM-N in psychiatry, have not
always been created using a consensus model even though such schemes may have been promoted
and applied as authoritative sources. Further, there may be conflicting views of scientific concepts,
and their meaning will evolve over time. Concept acquisition using a bottom-up approach is based
empiricist techniques, such as compilation of terms from samples ofrepresentative texts, produced
in a knowledge domain. This approach is questionable when applied in splendid isolation from
discourse analysis, Le. analysis of why and when who communicates what to whom. It is however
thought-provoking that this approach, which is based on the assumption of some kind of empirical
evidence, termed as "literary warrant", has hardly ever been questioned by LIS.
The topdown approach, however, has been subject to critique. Lancaster, who advocates that
concept acquisition should be based on "warrant" from the literature (literary warrant) or from the
information needs of the users (user warrant), warns against the topdown approach to concept
acquisition:
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The danger of this approach, which is exemplified by the work of the Engineers
Joint Council and by Project LEX is that the terms may lack true literary warrant,
or more particularly, that the vocabulary will be developed in an unbalanced way,
not providing variations in detail that truly reflect the varying needs ofa community
of users ("user warrant)". (Lancaster, 1977, p. 14)
How to arrive at "user warrant", reflecting 'the varying needs of a community of users', remains as
a difficult problem facing LIS. First, it would entail the presence of knowledge of who the users of
IR-systems are: disciplinary, interdisciplinary, laymen etc. Second, it would mean that we know
how they would like to communicate with IR-systems. Third, we would have to know something
about the 'variability' of their needs. Such a project seems rather comprehensive compared to
analyzing the variety of concepts in the written, e.g. scientific, literature, and expose this
information to the users in thesauri, providing them with a map which can be browsed as a ready-
to-hand knowledge source. One example of such a map is the Unified Medical Language System
(UMLS) (Schuyler et al, 1993), which exposes different views of biomedical concepts with scope
notes of their origin in different sources (classification schemes and thesauri). The latter approach
does not, however, indicate why and how these varieties have evolved, and further, it is a
metathesaurus, not a thesaurus which is applied by indexers as well as by users.
Concept analysis usually follows an approach of identifying generic categories of concepts, such
as actions or events, which are often applied as a basis for facet analysis and logical division of
terms. This approach is questioned by La. Frohmann:
The concept organization may be so different in different subject areas to justify
treating, for the purposes of classification, the relevant generic terms as standing for
different kinds of entity. It follows thatthe various hierarchies must be organized by
reference to the consensus or the problems within the relevant subject field...when
terms are used in different practices, the semantic relations between them will differ
accordingly" (Frohmann, 1983, p. 17)
When a thesaurus designer bases her work on literary or user warrant for concept acquisition, a
major problem remains: how to perform semantic control, Le. devise hierarchies and related term
relationships. Terms compiled from text corpora form an atomized amount of entities whose
semantic, contextual, communicative aspects have been lost - even though it is to sometimes
possible to identify semantic relationships via analysis of term co-occurrences. This means that the
designer is left with her intuitions or formal logic for creating such structures. We agree with
Frohmann's recommendations of adhering to consensus or problems within the relevant knowledge
domain. Otherwise the activity of semantic control will be conducted without guidance from the
lessons learned from concept acquisition.
We find that LIS is focussing very much on the formal, technical aspects of thesaurus construction
and needs to gain more guidance for the interpretative aspect of this activity. The formalist
approach is reflected in the practice of adhering to standard and generic recommendations for this
task (ISO, 1985), as pointed out by Svenonius (1986) and Krook & Lancaster (1993). The focus is
how to normalize and disambiguate the richness of natural language offered for free-text searching
in databases to fit the slimmer model of a thesaurus. Or, in the terminology of Frohmann (1994) to
Alexandria, VA, October 16, 1994 13 Albrechtsen & Hj0r1and
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Structures should be less rigid than traditionally, at least for thesauri. In some cases, a structure of
clustered concepts will be more communicative to the searcher than conventional hierachical/
network structures, in particular because a rigid structure will appear rather artificial in a field with
many new and evolving concepts.
We propose to rephrase the traditional "concept identification, concept analysis (and facet
analysis), terminological control, semantic control-model" as:
• Concept investigation and interpretation
• Choice of structures
• Concept articulation
Concept investigation and interpretation cover critical analyses of concept formations, variations
and developments rather than compilation of terms from documents (empiricist model) or
promotions of stand-alone semiotic systems (formalist control model). This imposes a more
epistemological and pragmatic level to this activity, which identifies conflicting views, arguments
etc., where facet analysis decomposes concepts into primitive constituents which- in isolation-
have no meaning.
14Albrechtsen & Hj~rland
build a classification system, in casu nne, as a stand-alone, purely semiotic system of call
numbers, which does not have any referent beyond itself. So we have two extreme models: i)
thesauri based on literary warrant referring to terms acquired at a certain point of time from a
certain text corpus ii) classification schemes built as stand-alone semiotic systems to which any
given document must submit. LIS (in particular Lancaster, 1977) offers one middle position
between these extremes in what he calls a "deductive method" for concept acquisition: to index a
number ofrepresentative documents and use the indexing terms as candidate thesaurus terms. He
thus implicitly introduces the importance of subjects in documents and in so doing, leaves the
responsibility for concept analysis to the indexers. What is lacking is a guidance for finding this
middle level of subjects in the gap between literary warrant and the construction of scientific
concepts. This guidance can be provided by adhering to an interpretative approach to constructing
knowledge organization scheme.
Concept articulation comprises an explanation and exposition of the knowledge about the
concepts, found during concept investigation and interpretation. This is suggested as a broadening
of the useful scope note facility often found in thesauri. Such extended scope notes can be of
different kinds: Explaining how a concept has evolved over time, exposing different conceptions
of the same concept, etc., hence providing a more pluralistic map of concepts for browsing than
has hitherto been provided. UMLS's project of mapping medical concepts from different
Knowledge Organization sources is one step in this direction (Schuyler et al, 1993). However, for
metathesauri, each K.O. source is in itself founded on different worldviews and has been produced
under certain constraints. For instance, the predecessor of nSM-IV, which has been analyses to
support a specific exclusive worldview, is part of the knowledge sources in UMLS, and such
information should be explicated to the searcher. Our recommendations for how to develop LIS
knowledge organization schemes, taking an interpretative rather than a formalist approach, should
be seen as an argument for more emphasis on the aspect of knowing rather than constructing. We
believe that this knowing on the part of the developer can function to provide more useful, flexible
and varied knowledge organization schemes which can support the choice of search strategies and
developments in knowledge on the part of the searcher.
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